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Clemency “is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the 
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better 
served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.”† 
 
“THE GOVERNOR’S COURT OF LAST 
RESORT:”†† AN INTRODUCTION TO 
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN ALASKA 
RONALD S. EVERETT* & DEBORAH PERIMAN** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article details the history of clemency and examines its use 
inAlaska. It begins by broadly describing the various forms of 
clemency and traces their evolution from ancient times to the present. 
After tracing the development of clemency in the United States and 
the Alaska Territory, the Article shifts its focus to clemency’s use 
during Alaska’s statehood. During most of this period, the clemency 
process has been exclusively within the governor’s discretionary 
powers and has taken place largely behind closed doors. However, in 
the aftermath of a controversial pardon by Governor Murkowski, 
Alaska’s historical model of clemency has been transformed into a 
process that makes the exercise of gubernatorial clemency power much 
morevisible. The Article explains these policy changes, now embodied 
in section 33.20.80 of the Alaska Statutes. Finally, it concludes that 
while the new procedures correct some of the problems associated with 
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the earlier clemency process, they leave unresolved one of the most 
critical issues for those seeking pardons – relief from the ongoing 
stigma resulting from a criminal conviction – and recommends that 
Alaska policy makers examine additional measures to afford former 
offenders a better chance for successful reentry into society. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Clemency, the act of mitigating the consequences of a criminal 
conviction, has been a fundamental feature of criminal justice systems 
throughout recorded history. The Code of Hammurabi specifically 
references clemency,1 as does the Old Testament.2 
The term refers to a broad range of post-conviction remedies 
including full or conditional pardons, remissions of fines, reprieves, and 
commutations of sentences.3 A full pardon allows the offender to walk 
away from his or her sentence; a partial pardon relieves the offender of 
some, but not all of the consequences of conviction. A conditional 
pardon hinges on the performance or nonperformance of specified acts.4 
Pardons may be individual (issued to a specific person) or general 
(issued to a class of persons). Although pardons are typically sought 
after conviction and sentencing, a pardon may be issued at any time, 
even before arrest and prosecution.5 In contrast to the pardon, a reprieve 
 
 1. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, § 129, http:// avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/ 
hamframe.asp. 
 2. See, e.g., Jeremiah 52:31–34. 
 3. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 n.12 (1993). The legal effect of each of 
these remedies differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, reflecting variations in 
state criminal codes and decisional law. However, each term had a generally 
accepted meaning in early Anglo-American law that has largely carried over 
into contemporary usage. 
 4. KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 5 (1989). As Blackstone explained, “the King may extend his mercy 
upon what terms he pleases, and may annex to his bounty a condition, either 
precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof the validity of the pardon 
will depend.” WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, ABRIDGMENT OF BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES, 493 (3d ed. 1895). See discussion infra at n.22–27 and 
accompanying text. 
 5. President Lincoln, for example, used a conditional pardon in advance of 
prosecution to encourage at least one Civil War deserter to return to his 
regiment. On December 23, 1863, Lincoln issued the following letter of pardon: 
The bearer, William Henry Craft, a corporal in Co. C. in the 82nd N.Y. 
Volunteers, comes to me voluntarily, under apprehension that he may 
be arrested, convicted, and punished as a deserter; and I hereby direct 
him to report forthwith to his regiment for duty, and, upon condition 
that he does this, and faithfully serves out his term, or until he shall be 
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will not allow an offender to escape punishment; it merely postpones it. 
Commutation of sentence reduces the severity of a sentence; in death 
penalty states, commutation is typically used to substitute a life sentence 
for a death sentence.6 
In the Alaska Territory, the history of clemency is the history of 
frontier development, replete with the kinds of storied characters that 
have long captured the imagination of armchair travelers. With 
statehood, executive clemency was written into the Alaska Constitution. 
Over the ensuing fifty years, clemency developed into an 
institutionalized, though largely unnoted, part of Alaska’s criminal 
justice system, with each of Alaska’s first ten governors awarding grants 
of clemency. Five years ago that changed dramatically. A controversial 
pardon by an unpopular governor triggered legislative changes to 
Alaska’s clemency process designed to transform clemency from a 
private act of executive mercy, largely concealed from public view, into 
an open government process subject to media and public scrutiny, 
requiring notice to certain crime victims, and incorporating mandatory 
investigation of all clemency applications by the state Board of Parole.7 
No grant of clemency has been awarded in Alaska since. An informal 
moratorium on clemency has existed for the last five years as the 
executive branch seeks to formalize revised procedures that will accord 
with the statutory changes. 
This Article begins with an overview of the history of clemency and 
how its development and use in Alaska compares to national 
developments in criminal justice. It then examines the process by which 
clemency in Alaska has been granted historically and the recent 
statutory and administrative changes to that process. Finally, it 
concludes by briefly highlighting a critical question not resolved by 
Alaska’s new legislation—the employability and reintegration of former 
offenders.8 
 
honorably discharged for any cause, he is fully pardoned for any 
supposed desertion heretofore committed. 
Lincoln’s Christmas Pardon, LINCOLN EDITOR (Ill. Historic Pres. Agency, 
Springfield, Ill.), Oct.–Dec. 2001, at 2, available at http:// 
www.papersofabrahamlincoln.org/Lincoln_Editor.htm. 
 6. MOORE, supra note 4, at 5. Commutation is thus a form of partial pardon. 
Id. 
 7. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.080 (2010). 
 8. This Article is the first of two reviewing the history and use of clemency 
in Alaska. This first is essentially a primer on history and procedure; the second 
will analyze the historical record of clemency awards in the state and make 
recommendations on how clemency procedures might be used to mitigate 
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I. OVERVIEW OF CLEMENCY USE AND POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Foundations of Early American Clemency Law 
“Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of 
law” as “the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice 
where judicial process has been exhausted.”9 The oldest recorded code 
of laws in existence,10 the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, makes 
specific reference to principles of clemency, forgiveness, and pardon. 
Section 129, for example, provided, “If a man’s wife be surprised (in 
flagrante delicto) with another man, both shall be tied and thrown into 
the water, but the husband may pardon his wife and the king his 
slaves.”11 So, too, does the Old Testament speak of lifting the penalties 
imposed on a transgressor and welcoming him back into society. Thus, 
the Book of Jeremiah tells of the King of Babylon releasing the King of 
Judah from prison and speaking kindly to him, whereupon the King of 
Judah “put off his prison garments. And every day of his life he dined 
regularly at the King’s table.”12 
In English law, the practice of pardon dates back at least as far as 
the reign of Edmund II in the tenth century, a period in which there is 
evidence of grants of royal pardon in “substantial numbers.”13 By the 
Middle Ages, well-defined rules of procedure controlled the clemency 
process.14 The statutes of 1390 and 1404, for example, outlined distinct 
administrative stages in the pardon process: 
The petition for pardon, having been acceded to by the king 
and the name of any interceder [surety] endorsed on it by the 
chamberlain, was sent normally to the keeper of the privy seal 
whose warrant took it to the chancery where, if it was an 
individual pardon, it was engrossed by one of the two crown 
clerks there. . . . On occasion the king gave instructions for the 
 
problems associated with disproportionate incarceration of minorities and to 
facilitate offender reentry. 
 9. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411 n.12. 
 10. JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW 73 (1927). The Code of Hammurabi 
is believed to date from between 2250 and 2000 B.C. Id. 
 11. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 1, § 129. 
 12. Jeremiah 52:31–34 (NRSV). 
 13. J.G. BELLAMY, THE CRIMINAL TRIAL IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 138 
(1998). 
 14. Id. 
Periman_final 5/5/2011 3:25:06 PM 
2011 CLEMENCY IN ALASKA 61 
drafting of a pardon to the chancellor by word of mouth. The 
grantee paid a standard fee into the hanaper [treasury], 
pleaded the pardon before the justices and gave the clerk of the 
court a pair of gloves or the value thereof as payment for its 
enrolment in the record. The pardon was then proclaimed.15 
The early English law also recognized benefit of clergy, a means of 
avoiding execution of sentence not dependent on exercise of the king’s 
prerogative.16 In general terms, benefit of clergy relieved an offender of 
the consequences of conviction when he or she was able to recite a 
particular passage of the Bible calling upon God’s mercy. 17 Originally 
available only to clerics,18 the practice over time was extended to 
offenders sufficiently literate to read the verse (at the time an elite and 
limited class of offenders) and gradually to any offender able to 
memorize and recite it.19 The standard text was Psalm 51, which begins 
“Have mercy on me, O God.”20 Eventually, this became known as the 
“neck verse,” in that it could be used to avoid hanging.21 The offenses 
for which benefit of clergy could be claimed varied over time but at 
common law generally excluded high treason, petit larceny, and 
misdemeanors. Non-clerics were allowed benefit of clergy only once. 
Accordingly, these offenders, once admitted to the benefit of clergy, 
were typically branded on the left thumb “with a hot iron” in order to 
prevent a subsequent claim of the privilege. 22 
By the time Blackstone wrote his great Commentaries on the Laws of 
England,23 English clemency practices had devolved into the distinct 
categories recognized today—chapter thirty-one of the Commentaries 
described the distinction between reprieve and pardon and detailed the 
 
 15. Id. at 139. 
 16. During the Middle Ages, it was common for clerics to “plead their 
clergy” at the outset of trial before secular authorities and demand to be handed 
over to the authority of the church. Id. at 135. 
 17. By judicial practice and by statute, the crimes for which benefit of clergy 
could be claimed, the class of offenders who could claim it, and the procedures 
for invoking the practice varied considerably. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358–67 (1st ed. 1765), available at 
http:// avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch28.asp. 
 18. The practice was founded on the scripture, “touch not mine anointed, 
and do my prophets no harm.” Id. at 359 n.a (citation omitted). 
 19. Id. at 360; see also BELLAMY, supra note 13, at 135–39. 
 20. Psalms 51:1 (NRSV). 
 21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1131 (9th ed. 2009). 
 22. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 360. 
 23. Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England were published between 
1765 and 1769. KERMIT HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 52 (1989). 
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grounds for each.24 Then, as now, a reprieve was a way of avoiding 
execution of a judgment temporarily; the pardon was permanent.25 
In Blackstone’s day, reprieve was available in a variety of 
circumstances. These circumstances included when an offender became 
non compo (incompetent or insane) between conviction and execution of 
the judgment, or in the case of a woman sentenced to death, pregnant.26 
A reprieve may be “ex necessitate legis: as where a woman is capitally 
convicted and pleads her pregnancy: though this is no cause to stay the 
judgment, yet it is to respite the execution till she be delivered.”27 
The pardon was within the discretion of the king; such grants were 
“the most amiable prerogative of the crown.”28 By statute, however, 
Parliament removed certain offenses from the king’s power to pardon. 
Offenses in the nature of private injuries rather than public wrongs were 
outside the king’s pardon power, as the suits were deemed “not of the 
[K]ing but of the party injured.”29 Nor could the king pardon a common 
nuisance so long as the nuisance remained “unredressed.”30 
The pardon procedure and the legal effect of a pardon were 
similarly well-established by this period. A complete pardon had legal 
effect only if granted under the “great seal.”31 Any falsehood or 
suppression of truth made in the petition voided the charter of pardon. 
Certain crimes were deemed outside the scope of a pardon issued in 
general words (a pardon of “all felonies”) unless specifically identified 
in the grant. These included piracy (not a felony punishable at common 
law), treason, murder, and rape.32 With respect to murder, the law of 
pardons further mandated that the charter specify whether it “was 
committed by lying in wait, assault, or malice prepense 
[aforethought].”33 Beyond these limitations, questions regarding the 
scope of a particular grant were to be construed in favor of the offender 
and against the crown.34 
 
 24. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 387–95. 
 25. SPRAGUE, supra note 4, at 490–91. 
 26. See id. at 491. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 492. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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B. Development of Clemency Law in the United States 
British colonists carried with them their understanding of clemency 
under the English monarchy. Hence, clemency has been available to 
criminal defendants in America since the earliest days of American 
criminal law.35 Blackstone’s understanding of the role of clemency in 
criminal justice was particularly important in the development of 
colonial and early American law; almost as many copies of his 
Commentaries were sold in America as in England.36 
As criminal law and procedure evolved in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, a wide range of additional influences shaped the 
use of clemency. Developments within the criminal justice system, such 
as amendments to criminal codes, shifting punishment goals, and 
changes in sentencing theory, have resulted in observable changes in the 
use of clemency powers. At the same time, external events, such as wars 
and major social, economic, and political changes, have influenced the 
extent to which executives have exercised their clemency power. 37 
Despite these changes, one central aspect of clemency has largely 
remained constant—clemency has remained an exercise of executive 
power with little structure or accountability. This “legacy of arbitrary 
exercise of the clemency power, an atavistic remnant of the royal 
prerogative, is today firmly established in our jurisprudence.”38 
 
 35. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412. 
 36. HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 23, at 52; see also ZANE, supra note 10, at 359 
(“[I]n the Colonies, where there were no schools of law, the Commentaries were 
hailed as absolutely essential to any legal education and as the only book in 
which extended legal knowledge could be easily acquired. . . . [M]ost students 
felt that the mastery of Blackstone was an entirely adequate preparation for the 
bar. . . . Every word of it was taken as legal gospel.”). 
 37. The changing uses of clemency in a given jurisdiction reveal much about 
the uses and goals of criminal punishment in that jurisdiction. Historical records 
typically describe the process by which clemency is granted or provide an 
inventory of the recipients of clemency. Often the records also include some 
form of critique or assessment on the uses of clemency; this discussion 
illuminates the theories of punishment prevalent in the time or place at issue. 
Unfortunately, there was limited systematic analysis of clemency decision-
making until the late 1900s. Thus, there is little accumulated data available for 
study. Contemporary research has investigated the use of clemency in the 
context of the death penalty almost exclusively; relatively little data exists 
outside this context. 
 38. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning 
Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 572–73 (1991). 
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1. Colonial America 
Although the law of England was the single greatest influence on 
the development of law in most of the colonies, colonial lawmakers 
began to repudiate what they viewed as overly harsh or repressive 
aspects of the English criminal law as the spirit of revolution grew more 
widespread.39 Reform of the criminal law developed as an important 
goal during the revolutionary period.40 A fundamental part of this 
change was a great reduction in the use of capital punishment and 
various forms of corporal punishments.41 This change reflected the 
colonists’ changed relationship with their government, from subjects of 
a monarchy to citizens in a free republic. 
Reduction in the severity of punishment, however, did not 
correlate with an expanded use of the clemency power. In fact, the 
opposite was generally true. For much of the colonial period, colonists 
“opposed what they viewed as the excessive use of executive pardons 
and other mechanisms like the ‘benefit of clergy’ that gave the guilty a 
reprieve from their death sentences.”42 Because clemency was seen as 
the king’s royal prerogative that had been exercised capriciously, its 
restriction was advocated to ensure the effectiveness of less severe 
punishments meted out by the new criminal justice system.43 
2. Early American Law 
Despite growing resistance to the executive power of clemency 
during the colonial period, it was ultimately considered an integral part 
of the powers of the executive. Thus, the power to grant “reprieves and 
pardons” was one of the enumerated powers accorded the President in 
Article II of the Constitution.44 Chief Justice Marshall, in one of the 
earliest recorded interpretations of the executive clemency power, 
described it thus: 
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power 
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the 
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the 
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, 
though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the 
 
 39. See MARIE GOTTSHCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF 
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 44 (2006). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 45. 
 43. See id. 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not 
communicated officially to the court.45 
In the new republic, the opposition to clemency of the colonial era 
soon dissipated. By the early 1800s, clamor for clemency was 
widespread. “In Massachusetts between 1828 and 1866, pardons were 
granted to 12.5 percent of all prisoners . . . .”46 During this period 
pardons again served multiple purposes. Most obviously, they reduced 
sentence length and indirectly relieved prison overcrowding while 
maintaining an ancient practice found in virtually all systems of justice.47 
As in earlier periods of history, the rewards of clemency for both 
the executive authority and recipient remained substantial. The 
problems created by clemency were substantial too, and similar to those 
of earlier periods. As the use of clemency grew, the numbers of 
applications could be overwhelming and the grants, in practice, were 
often arbitrary and capricious. One investigation of period records 
“found that pardon requests were the largest single category of 
correspondence for some southern governors.”48 
Alexis de Tocqueville49 and Gustave de Beaumont spent 
considerable time observing and commenting on the operation of 
democracy in the new United States, leading to the 1835 publication of 
the first volume of their classic work, Democracy in America. Although 
often overlooked, this study included a separate and detailed 
examination of the development and operation of the new penitentiary 
system. While not the primary focus of the investigation, the issue of 
clemency is identified in the preface to Beaumont and Tocqueville’s 
report as perhaps the most critical flaw in the new American system of 
criminal justice: 
 
Two things seem very certain: 
1. That as long as the pardoning power shall be abused in the 
way that now but too frequently happens, the effect of 
penitentiaries, as well as of criminal justice, can be but 
limited. 
 
 45. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160–61 (1833). 
 46. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 101–02 (1998). 
 47. HARRY E. BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 133 (2d ed. 1972). 
 48. WALKER, supra note 46, at 102. 
 49. Alexis de Tocqueville was a French sociologist and historian who toured 
the new United States from 1831 to 1832 with his friend Gustave de Beaumont, 
officially to study the American prison system. 
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2. That as long as one individual in a state is invested with 
the pardoning power, it will be often abused to the injury 
of society.50 
 
In one of their final commentaries, the observers from the Old 
World reviewed several documents listing a sample of prisoners from 
Auburn and Sing Sing penitentiaries51 who had been pardoned between 
1822 and 1831, and offered “some observations on the use of the 
prerogative of pardon in the United States.”52 These observations, and 
their suggestions for reform of the pardon power, are relevant to 
contemporary discussions. They concluded that the “less this authority 
is elevated above the rest of society, and the less independent it is, the 
greater will be the abuse of pardoning.”53 Their report cited the results 
of an earlier study of the pardoning process that found a thriving trade 
in New York built on the securing of pardons for profit.54 The report 
stated “there are men who make a regular trade of procuring pardons 
for convicts, by which they support themselves. They exert themselves 
to obtain signatures to recommendations to the executive authority to 
extend pardon to those by whom they are employed.”55 
Beumont and Tocqueville’s conclusions echoed the findings of an 
earlier investigation, which stated: 
It is obvious that the grant of pardon does not depend on the 
degree of guilt, but on the pecuniary means of the convict to 
hire the members of this corps. A person convicted of murder 
in the second degree, attended with the most aggravating 
circumstances, who has powerful friends, or is plentifully 
supplied with money, has tenfold more chance of pardon, than 
 
 50. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE xxix (Francis Lieber 
trans., 1833). 
 51. Auburn Penitentiary in Auburn, New York symbolized the emerging 
theory of rehabilitation in the early 19th century. Its construction was authorized 
in 1816; and it was completed soon after. The specific architectural style 
eventually included the tiered cell block and congregate work areas that came to 
represent what was known as the Auburn system or “silent system” of 
correctional philosophy. The Auburn system required strict silence enforced 
through corporal punishments along with hard work, social isolation, and strict 
regimentation. In 1826 an Auburn-style prison was opened in Ossining, New 
York. This prison is more commonly known as Sing Sing prison. LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77–82 (1993). 
 52. BEAUMONT & TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 50, at 233. 
 53. Id. at 235. 
 54. Id. at 236. 
 55. Id. 
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a poor wretch found guilty of petty larceny.56 
 Throughout this period, awards of clemency resulted from acts of 
grace rather than systematic decision-making. By this time, all governors 
had the power to pardon and dispensed their prerogative with limited 
or, in most instances, no rules or guidelines. “All in all, the process 
disfavored the ‘poor and friendless,’ or the ‘miserable foreigner.’ The 
executive ear never heard their ‘groans’; instead, he pardoned ‘the rich, 
the intelligent, the powerful villains.’”57 
3. Civil War, Reconstruction, and Jim Crow 
Heah comes yo’ woman, a pardon in her han’ 
Gonna say to de boss, I want mah man, 
Let the Midnight Special shine its light on me58 
Immediately after the Civil War and during reconstruction, first 
President Lincoln and then President Johnson dispensed clemency 
liberally to restore peace and reintegrate those who had fought against 
the Union. The one condition was that they must take an oath to uphold 
the Constitution.59 
Through the end of the nineteenth century, the clemency process 
was less well defined in most southern states than it was in the North. 
This was true for two reasons. First, the use of corporal punishments 
persisted and remained more common in southern states well into the 
early twentieth century. As a result, the penitentiary, and later the 
prison, were used to a lesser extent and developed more slowly when 
compared to the North, particularly the Northeast. Second, starting in 
the antebellum years and continuing through Reconstruction and 
beyond, the South resisted the penitentiary movement “because, among 
other things, advocates of the penitentiary were identified with the 
abolitionist cause . . . . The association in the South of crime with race 
made it impossible to embrace rehabilitation, the purported raison d’être 
for the penitentiary.”60 
Nonetheless, almost all southern states eventually built 
penitentiaries, though they did not embrace them as enthusiastically as 
 
 56. Id. at 237. 
 57. FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 162. 
 58. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE 
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 179 (1996). In this freedom song, the Midnight 
Special referred to a train that left Jackson, Mississippi at midnight every fifth 
Saturday night and was used by the wives and girlfriends of African-American 
inmates held at the notorious Parchman State Penitentiary. Id. 
 59. Kobil, supra note 38, at 593. 
 60. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 39, at 48. 
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their northern counterparts, nor did they use them to their fullest 
capacity. After the Civil War and the destruction of most of the 
penitentiaries in the South, the convict-lease system61 developed as a less 
costly alternative that did not require capital investment and provided 
needed labor to rebuild the agricultural economy. The convict laborers 
were predominantly African-American, most of whom were almost 
certainly former slaves. “Several studies of the convict-lease system 
demonstrate that it was integral to the political and economic life of the 
South for decades after the Civil War.”62 Nearly all southern states 
finally banned the convict-lease system by the middle of the 1920s.63 
In those southern states with no system of parole, the pardon 
process was the convict’s only source of hope. Its importance is 
underscored in this poignant quote from one inmate’s letter home: “You 
know the one star in the night of our sorrow is the hope of a pardon . . . . 
No matter how desperate our chances, no matter how frequent or bitter 
our disappointments have been in the past, we cling to this hope as to 
life itself.”64 
It was in this context that a distinct pardoning system developed in 
the South, with many southern states having no laws governing the 
process. To most convicts, particularly African-Americans, the standards 
for clemency seemed capricious and the process corrupt. Both the 
demands for pardons and the prison population itself were directly 
connected in a positive correlation with the vitality of the economy and 
demand for labor. Nevertheless, even absent specific procedures or laws 
to govern pardoning “[t]here was a distinct ritual to the pardon process 
that everyone understood.”65 Perhaps the best documented accounts of 
the southern pardon ritual are from Parchman Prison in Mississippi. 
To win an early release, an inmate had to have the backing of 
his camp sergeant and the Parchman superintendent. Their 
recommendations were essential. Next, the inmate published a 
 
 61. The convict-lease system was organized around the leasing of convicts 
by prison authorities to private contractors, who were able to exploit the convict 
labor with little oversight. In the South after the Civil War, the convict-lease 
system was a critical development in the transition from an agricultural system 
based on slavery. It was not the rebirth of slavery, but it was in some respects 
worse. Unlike slave-owners, with a vested financial interest in their slaves, “[t]he 
private contractors had no incentive to invest in the well-being of the leased 
convicts. After all, if a convict died, the state supplied another one for the same 
bargain price. Mortality rates were extraordinarily high.” Id. at 49. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 51. 
 64. OSHINSKY, supra note 58, at 180. 
 65. Id. at 181. 
Periman_final 5/5/2011 3:25:06 PM 
2011 CLEMENCY IN ALASKA 69 
petition for pardon in his local newspaper, stating the reasons 
for his request. The petition alerted his community, which then 
lobbied the governor by mail. A typical pardon file contained 
the letters of dozens of interested parties – sheriffs, judges, 
attorneys, planters, and ministers – comprising the ‘best’ white 
opinion of the town.66 
4. The Era of Rehabilitation (1900 – mid-1970s) 
In the early twentieth century, the development of indeterminate 
sentencing and the underlying philosophy of rehabilitation became a 
more dominant influence on the punishment process, particularly in the 
North. This changed the role and uses of clemency. Clemency has 
historically served diverse purposes. One of the most recognized 
purposes has been the mitigation of severe punishments, including 
commutation of death sentences. However, clemency has also served to 
reduce prison overcrowding, and the promise of a pardon or 
commutation of sentence was used by prison officials to encourage good 
behavior and gain the cooperation of inmates. 
During this era of rehabilitation, as the indeterminate sentence 
coupled with parole became more common, the need for and purposes 
of the pardon changed. In fact, “[t]he desire to free governors from the 
burden of pardon-seekers contributed to the development of parole.”67 
Parole could be used to mitigate sentences and address prison crowding, 
functions previously served by the pardon process. Parole was also 
viewed as correcting problems of fairness and bias that were endemic to 
the granting of clemency, by substituting the structured, visible process 
of parole for the more capricious grant of clemency. “Parole . . . was, in 
theory, controlled by professionals, using rational criteria. No doubt in 
practice it, too, worked against the poor and friendless, but more 
subtly.”68 
By mid-century, these reforms were an established feature of the 
criminal justice process, intended to enhance the fairness and humanity 
of the system. However, in practice the indeterminate sentence and 
parole process was rife with bias, resulting in ineffective punishments. 
As evidence of these problems mounted, the age of rights reform rapidly 
transitioned into a period of punitive backlash—a transformation clearly 
evident by the 1970s. 
 
 66. Id. at 180. 
 67. WALKER, supra note 46, at 102. 
 68. FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 162. 
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Historically, and over the course of the period, clemency was 
usually a routine part of criminal justice that went unnoticed or at least 
uncommented upon by the general public.69 Presidential pardons at the 
end of administrations and pardons of sensational or celebrated cases 
have been the exception, but even in these cases attention dissipated 
quickly. The exception to this was the death penalty—it is in this context 
that clemency has been most visible to the public. 
During this era of rehabilitation, several investigators noted that 
the use of clemency to commute death sentences to life in prison 
consistently declined.70 The decline was particularly marked following 
the backlash of the 1970s. “Fewer and fewer people were actually put to 
death: 199 in 1933; 82 in 1950; only 2 in 1967 . . . . From 1967 to Furman 
[in 1972]71 when the issue was finally adjudicated in the Supreme Court, 
no one was executed at all.”72 
[There] is a marked decrease from the number of clemencies 
granted prior to the Court’s 1972 moratorium on capital 
punishment. For instance, from 1960 to 1971—only an eleven-
year period, as opposed to the twenty-five years from Gregg73 
to the present—204 death sentences were commuted. Before 
the Supreme Court’s moratorium, one out of every four or five 
death sentences was commuted to life imprisonment. By 1990 
that ratio had dwindled to one commutation for every forty 
death-sentences.74 
 
 69. Unremarkable routine decision-making seems to characterize the 
granting of most clemencies in Alaska until the middle 1970s. See discussion in 
Part II.B infra. 
 70. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital 
Clemency, 17 J.L. & POL. 669, 675–77 (2001); Austin Sarat, Memorializing 
Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions in the Killing State, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
183, 186 (2008). 
 71. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). Furman struck down the 
death penalty and temporarily halted executions nationwide. Id. 
 72. FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 316. 
 73. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). In Gregg, the majority 
reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty. Id. 
 74. Gershowitz, supra note 70, at 675–76. 
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5. The War on Crime75 Era (Mid-1970s to Present) 
The war on crime during the past thirty years has produced 
numerous changes in the criminal justice system. One of the most 
obvious and detectable changes is the increasingly punitive focus of the 
system76 and its increasingly disproportionate impact on minorities.77 
This change can also be detected in reductions in actions that require 
discretionary decision-making. For example, many jurisdictions have 
either eliminated traditional parole or significantly reduced its use.78 
Sentencing guidelines and forms of determinate sentencing have 
reduced judicial discretion to sentence.79 Further, mandatory minimum 
sentences punish categories of offenses rather than individual offenders. 
Taken together, all of these changes led to a significant reduction in 
the use of executive clemency.80 Most investigators attribute the decline 
to political decision-making by executives and a decline in the 
humanitarian motivations of the earlier reform era. Get-tough criminal 
justice politics and the overall war on crime and drugs beginning in the 
late 1970s created a political climate wherein few elected officials 
wanted to risk appearing to be soft on crime.81 
 
 75. The “war on crime” is a metaphor used to describe a general shift in 
criminal justice and other social policies toward punitive “get-tough” 
approaches. The politicization of crime and law and order rhetoric became 
increasingly noticeable in the statements of Barry Goldwater during the 1964 
presidential election. Subsequently these views were amplified by President 
Richard Nixon to include a war on drugs, and institutionalized in national 
criminal justice and social welfare policies by President Reagan. See KATHERINE 
BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE 48–72 (2d ed. 2004); 
CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA 3–28 (1999); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR 
DISCIPLINE 259–83 (1993). 
 76. See generally BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 75, at 1–11. 
 77. See generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 
34–51 (2007). 
 78. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 183 (2004) (“In our time, 
sixteen states have abolished parole release altogether . . . .”); SIMON, supra note 
75, at 114–37 (discussing 1970s changes in the California parole system that 
reduced discretion). 
 79. KATE STITH AND JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 78–85 (1998). 
 80. Grants of clemency by Alaska governors during this period followed a 
similar pattern. From 1959 to 2011 there have been 188 acts of clemency officially 
recorded. However, 118 of those acts of clemency (61%) occurred in the decade 
between 1959 and 1969. See discussion and Table infra Part II.B. 
 81. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 13–31 (2007). 
There are other reasonable explanations for this decline in clemencies related to 
the death penalty. The criminal justice system improved in all respects during 
this time period, reducing the need to correct mistakes or incompetence, and 
overt racism became much less evident. Although these assessments are 
doubtless true, most evidence suggests that the politicization of criminal justice 
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It is within the context of these broad national trends in criminal 
justice policy that the law of clemency in Alaska developed. 
II. CLEMENCY IN ALASKA 
A. Territorial Alaska 
For a generation following the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 
1867, the Alaska Territory was operated by the Federal Government as a 
military district, subject to divided rule by the U.S. Army, Navy, and 
Treasury Department.82 Alaska’s first civil government was not 
established until 1884, when the Forty-Eighth Congress denominated 
the area a “civil and judicial district.”83 This first Organic Act provided 
for a governor and a district judge, but expressly prohibited a legislative 
assembly. 84 
Congress spent little time establishing a system of laws specifically 
applicable to Alaska, using just four and one-half pages of the session 
laws to create the government. Rather than directly addressing Alaska’s 
legal system, Congress declared the laws of Oregon to be the law of the 
district to the extent not in conflict with federal law.85 The system of 
government thus created was largely ineffectual. Thomas Carter, editor 
of Alaska’s first compilation of laws, noted in his introduction that 
doubts and confusion over the effect of the Organic Act “embarrassed 
the courts and the bar and sorely perplexed the people.”86 
The office of governor was similarly weak. One federal judge, 
construing the early law of the territory, observed that although the 
governor was charged with overseeing the territorial interests of the 
United States Government, he was “completely without actual power 
except such as can be exercised by example or precept or moral 
suasion.”87 
Given the paucity of issues directly addressed by Congress in the 
Organic Act, and the absence of real power granted the governor, it is 
 
policy during this period was the greatest influence on discretionary decision-
making. 
 82. See VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 4 (1975); 
ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA 33 (1954). 
 83. GRUENING, supra note 82, at 49. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. THOMAS H. CARTER, THE LAWS OF ALASKA xvii (1900). 
 87. Reherd v. Manders, 66 F. Supp. 520, 525 (D. Alaska 1946) (construing 
gubernatorial power prior to 1933). 
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interesting that the governor’s power of clemency was deemed 
sufficiently important to warrant specific mention. Among the first 
territorial governor’s few powers was the authority “to grant reprieves 
for offenses against the laws of the district or of the United States.”88 
This authority was, however, subject to the President’s “power to review 
and to confirm or annul any reprieves granted or other acts done by 
him.”89 
In 1900 Congress passed “An Act Making Further Provision for a 
Civil Government for Alaska, and for Other Purposes.”90 This legislation 
provided the district “a system of statutory law more elaborate than 
ha[d] heretofore been enacted.”91 Section 2 of the new “Political Code” 
reiterated the Governor’s power to issue temporary reprieves pending 
action by the President.92 
Twelve years later, Congress passed a second Organic Act, 
restructuring Alaska’s government and authorizing the territory’s first 
legislature; the first territorial legislature convened in 1913–1914.93 This 
legislature retained the governor’s limited authority over the clemency 
process. He still had no pardon authority, but could grant temporary 
reprieves for territorial and federal offenses. As under the prior Act, 
these reprieves were effective only until the President’s decision on the 
matter was made known.94 
It was not until 1919 that the territorial legislature statutorily 
empowered the governor to grant pardons, and this power was limited 
to misdemeanors against the laws of the territory. However, the 
editorial notes to the Compiled Laws of Alaska 1933 indicate that the 
section was deemed “inoperative on the ground that its provisions 
transcend the powers of the Legislature.”95 The governor continued to 
lack authority to issue pardons for more serious territorial crimes and 
for crimes against the United States. 
Thus, under both Organic Acts and for much of the early territorial 
period, clemency was primarily within the purview of the nation’s 
president rather than the territorial governor. But, the governor’s 
clemency power was increased significantly under the revised code of 
 
 88. Organic Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 2, 23 Stat. 24, 24. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Ch. 786, § 98, 31 Stat. 321, 493 (1900). 
 91. CARTER, supra note 86, at xviii. 
 92. Id. at 131–32; Act of June 6, 1900, tit. I, ch. 1, § 2, 31 Stat. 321, 321–22. 
 93. FISCHER, supra note 82, at 5. 
 94. See ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 1651 (1933) (noting this section was 
derived from section 350 of the Compiled Laws of Alaska 1913). 
 95. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 1655 note, at 359. 
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1949. The new code authorized the governor to “grant pardons and 
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures” for all territorial offenses, and 
retained his authority to grant reprieves for offenses against the United 
States.96 This statutory authority did not change over the remainder of 
the territorial period. 
One of the most colorful clemency cases ever to reach the United 
States Supreme Court began as a criminal prosecution in the Alaska 
Territory, and eventually demonstrated the governor’s power of 
reprieve under the Political Code of 1900.97 Vuco Perovich was a 
Montenegrin immigrant who made his way north to the Alaska 
Territory sometime around the turn of the century.98 He was convicted 
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be hanged on September 
15, 1905.99 
The United States Supreme Court opinion affirming the conviction 
notes that the evidence against Perovich was entirely circumstantial.100 
There was, in fact, some question whether a homicide had occurred.101 
The alleged victim in the case was a fisherman who lived alone in a log 
cabin covered by a tent about halfway between Fairbanks and Chena.102 
He was last seen alive in the early afternoon of October 28, 1904, at a 
Fairbanks bank.103 He was observed to have in his possession several 
gold nuggets, a Yukon gold ring, and a gold chain watch charm.104 The 
next morning a witness heard his dogs barking and two gun shots 
coming from the direction of the cabin.105 About noon that day, the 
victim’s partner found the cabin partially consumed by fire, and the 
ground near the bunk area saturated with oil;106 evidence was presented 
that the victim had one and one-half gallons of olive oil in the cabin at 
the time of his death.107 
 
 96. ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 5-1-2  at 106 (1949). 
 97. The case is also noteworthy for being one of the few in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued two separate opinions. In Perovich v. United States, the 
Court affirmed the conviction. 205 U.S. 86, 92 (1907). In Biddle v. Perovich, the 
Court ruled on whether the president had authority to commute the death 
sentence in the absence of the convicted’s consent. 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). 
 98. Fight for Liberty Lasts 22 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1926, at 10. 
 99. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 485. 
 100. Perovich, 205 U.S. at 89. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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The victim’s partner also testified that he saw in the bunk area of 
the cabin the back part of a head, a leg bone, and the trunk of a man.108 
Another witness testified that he had been with Perovich at the 
deceased’s cabin, and Perovich told him “the deceased had a roll of 
money, and that he would lick him with an ax some day and throw him 
in the water, or that he would make a fire and burn everything up.”109 
The day after the fire, a witness observed Perovich with a Yukon ring 
and a gold watch and chain in his possession.110 Perovich gave 
conflicting statements about the watch and was arrested the next day.111 
At trial in Fairbanks, the defense moved for a directed verdict on 
grounds “the corpus delicti had not been proved.”112 The trial court 
declined to take the case from the jury, which thereafter convicted 
Perovich. In 1907, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction, finding that although no one observed a homicide and the 
body in the cabin was never identified owing to its condition after the 
fire, all circumstances together were sufficient to support the jury’s 
verdict.113 
Upon losing his appeal, Perovich applied to President Theodore 
Roosevelt for commutation of sentence. Pending Roosevelt’s decision, he 
applied to the governor of the territory for a reprieve pursuant to the 
clemency provisions of the Political Code of 1900.114 The governor 
granted the reprieve, and the execution was stayed until February 1, 
1908.115 President Roosevelt subsequently denied the request for 
commutation and the U.S. Marshal set the date for execution.116 
It was at this point that an interesting case became a fascinating 
one. Vuco Perovich was not hanged in 1908; he applied a second time 
for clemency, benefitting this time from a change in administration. 
Approximately two months after taking office, President Taft commuted 
Perovich’s sentence to life in prison.117 Perovich was transferred to 
McNeil Island Penitentiary in Washington State, as was then standard 
for territorial prisoners, and later transferred to Leavenworth 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 90. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 90–91. 
 113. Id. 
 114.  Perovich v. Perry, 167 F. 789, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1909). 
 115. Id. at 790. 
 116. Id. at 791 (affirming the U.S. District Court’s dismissal of Perovich’s writ 
of habeas corpus); see also Fight for Liberty, supra note 98. 
 117. Fight for Liberty, supra note 98. 
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Penitentiary in Kansas.118  He served sixteen years there.119 In 1925, after 
being denied parole multiple times,120 and after having at least two more 
requests for pardon denied,121 Perovich filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the U.S. District Court for Kansas.122 He argued that Taft’s 
grant of clemency was void in that the commutation of sentence from 
death to life imprisonment did not merely decrease the extent of 
punishment, but rather entirely changed the nature of his punishment, 
an act for which the President lacked authority.123 
The U.S. District Court agreed. First, the court confirmed that the 
power of clemency extends only to the power to reduce a sentence, not 
to change its character.124 It then considered the character of a life 
sentence versus a death sentence: 
No one would question that a change of sentence from life 
imprisonment to 20 years would be a reduction in a sentence, 
and hence a commutation, for the punishment in both cases 
would be identical in kind, the only difference being in the 
length of the sentence; but who would say that a sentence of 
imprisonment for one year is a less[er] punishment than that of 
exile for two years? The two punishments are so different in 
kind that they cannot be compared. Again, is life imprisonment 
preferable to death? To some, it might be; to others, it might not 
be. The two punishments differ in their very nature and 
character. To an innocent man, imprisonment for life might 
well be a life of torture, a living hell, compared to which death 
might be a kindness. 
The facts surrounding the murder of which [Perovich] was 
found guilty were more or less circumstantial, and [he] has at 
all times insisted that he was absolutely innocent. He now 
stands before this court, protesting his innocence, although 
realizing that, if his contention that the order of the President 
was void is upheld by this court, the result will be that he will 
then be facing the original sentence of death. Knowing this, and 
protesting his innocence, he prefers the sentence of the court 
(death) to the substituted punishment which the President 
ordered. This court is convinced that what President Taft 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927). 
 122. Ex Parte Perovich, 9 F.2d 124, 124 (D. Kan. 1925). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 125. 
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actually did was to entirely change the nature and grade of [the 
punishment].125 
The court then noted that federal law does not authorize the 
President to “invade the province of the jury” and determine the nature 
of the sentence to be inflicted “simply because to his mind it might 
appear preferable.”126 The district court concluded that President Taft, 
by changing the nature of the punishment, had imposed a conditional 
pardon rather than grant a commutation of Perovich’s sentence.127 
Citing Chief Justice Marshall, the court noted that a pardon is effective 
only upon consent and acceptance by the defendant.128 Because Perovich 
had “never accepted the change of sentence ordered by the 
President,”129 the order was void and “[did] not authorize the warden of 
the United States penitentiary to restrain [Perovich] of his liberty.”130 
The court ordered the writ of habeas corpus to issue131 and Perovich “to 
be set at large.”132 
On the Government’s appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
certified to the United States Supreme Court the question of the 
President’s legal authority to commute a death sentence to life 
imprisonment.133 Justice Holmes, writing for court, rejected the 
conclusions of the District Court, holding that the President has such 
authority.134 Holmes wrote that English law had never required the 
defendant’s consent to anything but a conditional pardon, which 
required for its execution some affirmative act by the defendant.135 
Setting precedent aside, Holmes held that in the twentieth century, 
pardons had ceased to function as acts of private grace and had instead 
become an institutionalized part of the justice system, with the interests 
of the public, and not those of the prisoner,136 of paramount concern: 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 125–26. “Circumstances may be made to bring innocence under the 
penalties of the law. If so brought, escape by confession of guilt implied in the 
acceptance of a pardon may be rejected, preferring to be the victim of the law 
rather than its acknowledged transgressor, preferring death even to such certain 
infamy.” Id. at 125 (quoting Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90 (1915)). 
 129. Id. at 125. 
 130. Id. at 126. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927). 
 133. Id. at 485–86. 
 134. Id. at 487. 
 135. Id. 
 136. The district court’s holding, Holmes reasoned, would require the 
executive to permit an execution he had decided “ought not to take place unless 
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A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an 
individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the 
Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of 
the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better 
served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. Just as 
the original punishment would be imposed without regard to 
the prisoner’s consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he 
liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent determines 
what shall be done.137 
Justice Holmes went on to note the practical difficulties associated 
with the District Court’s ruling: 
 
When we come to the commutation of death to imprisonment 
for life it is hard to see how consent has any more to do with it 
than it has in the cases first put. Supposing that Perovich did 
not accept the change, he could not have got himself hanged 
against the Executive order.138 
 
Ultimately, the court observed that the Constitution gives the 
President power to grant reprieves and pardons, and that “[b]y common 
understanding imprisonment for life is a less[er] penalty than death”; 
the commutation from death to life imprisonment did not require 
Perovich’s consent.139 
The Supreme Court’s decision was issued at the end of May 1927,140 
about eighteen months after the District Court issued the writ of habeas 
corpus.141 The New York Times reported that pursuant to the writ, 
Perovich had been released on his own recognizance during the interim. 
He promptly left Kansas and moved to Rochester, New York where he 
 
the change is agreed to by one who on no sound principle ought to have any 
voice in what the law should do for the welfare of the whole.” Id. at 487. 
 137. Id. at 486. 
 138. Id. at 487. 
 139. Id. Chief Justice Taft, who as president had commuted Perovich’s 
sentence, recused himself from the case. See id. at 488. The June 13, 1927 issue of 
Time magazine summarized the holding, noting: “As Associate Justice Holmes 
read the decision upholding [the commutation of sentence], despatches reported 
that ‘Chief Justice Taft smiled broadly.’” The Judiciary: Supreme Court’s Week, 
TIME, June 13, 1927, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/ 
0,8816,730680,00.html#. 
 140. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 480. 
 141. Ex Parte Perovich, 9 F.2d 124, 124, 126 (D. Kan. 1925). 
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opened a barber shop.142 A month after the Supreme Court’s ruling that 
he must serve out his term, Perovich filed another application for 
complete pardon.143 President Coolidge granted his request that same 
summer.144 Time Magazine’s August 15, 1927 issue reported that Mr. 
Perovich hoped to make a switch from his “prosperous barbering 
business” to acting, and “dramatize his own life as a cinemactor.”145 
Another turn of the century territorial case, that of Lottie Burns, 
decided just a few years after commutation of Vuco Perovich’s death 
sentence, illustrates perhaps a more mundane, but equally important 
use of the clemency power—to adjust individual sentences where guilt 
is not at issue but circumstances render the original sentence unjust or 
overly harsh. In Lottie Burns’s case, this meant adjusting her sentence to 
accommodate the challenges of everyday life in territorial Alaska.146 She 
was convicted in Nome of selling liquor without a license.147 Her one-
year sentence was to expire in February 1912.148 In the fall of 1911, she 
sought clemency.149 Her petition asked for relief in the alternative: either 
“immediate release or the privilege of remaining in jail several months 
after her sentence [expired] in order to escape the hardships which 
surely would follow the termination of her imprisonment in the dead of 
Winter in Alaska.”150 The October 5, 1911 New York Times reported that 
President Taft granted her release at once, to provide her “the 
opportunity to gather food and fuel for the Winter.”151 
Finally, a 1906 clemency case out of New York, though it reveals 
nothing about operation of the territorial law, provides a glimpse into 
the immense discretion held by governors of the era in their use of the 
clemency power. Thomas P. Wickes was a “prominent” New York 
lawyer of “about 50 years of age” sentenced to a year’s imprisonment on 
 
 142. Fight for Liberty, supra note 98; see also The Judiciary: Supreme Court’s Week, 
supra note 139 (“At large, Mr. Perovich opened a barber shop [where he] has 
spent the last two years law-abidingly wielding shears and razor.”). 
 143. Perovich Seeks a Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1927, at 29. 




 145. Id. 
 146. See Taft Pardons Nome Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1911, at 10. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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Blackwell’s Island152 for an attempted blackmail conviction.153 In an 
article headlined, “Pardon for Wickes Exiles Him to Alaska,” the New 
York Times reported that Wickes’s crime caused “a widespread 
sensation.”154 Wickes “counted among his friends many Supreme Court 
Justices and Federal Judges, and had a large and remunerative 
practice.”155 After Wickes had served seven months of his sentence, 
Governor Higgins, allegedly on the recommendation of “men prominent 
in New York legal circles” commuted his sentence, effecting Wickes’s 
immediate release.156 The Times reported that the release was 
conditioned upon Wickes going to Alaska and never returning to New 
York City.157 
B. Clemency from Statehood to the Palin Administration 
The rich history of clemency in the United States was not lost on 
the delegates to Alaska’s Constitutional Convention. Describing the 
governor’s right to grant a pardon as “the individual’s . . .  chance of last 
resort,”158 the delegates approved a provision that became Section 21 of 
Article III of the Alaska Constitution. It reads: “Subject to procedure 
prescribed by law, the governor may grant pardons, commutations, and 
reprieves, and may suspend and remit fines and forfeitures.”159 In 1961, 
at the request of Alaska’s first governor,160 William Egan, the Second 
Alaska Legislature added executive clemency to the state’s legislative 
code.161 The legislative grant of authority extended the governor’s 
 
 152. The famous penitentiary at New York’s Blackwell’s Island (now 
Roosevelt Island) was the subject of a 1914 report from the Commissioner of 
Corrections to the mayor “in which the treatment of prisoners was described as 
‘vile and inhuman’ and the prison cells as ‘wet, slimy, dark, foul smelling, and 
unfit for pigs to wallow in.’” Blackwell’s Island a Prison Terrible, N.Y. TIMES, March 
27, 1914, at 20. 
 153. Pardon for Wickes Exiles Him to Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1906, at 14. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Minutes of the 53rd Day of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Jan. 14, 
1956) (statement of Del. Hugh Douglas Gray), available at http:// 
www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/53.html (explaining the nature of 
clemency). 
 159. ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 21. Section 21 further provides that the 
clemency power does not extend to impeachment and mandates establishment 
of a parole system. Id. 
 160. Legislative Reporting Serv., Inc., H. 2, 1st Sess., at 29 (1961). 
 161. See Act of March 7, 1961, ch. 16, 1961 Alaska Sess. Laws 10. 
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clemency power to crimes against the state as well as crimes against the 
territory.162 
Although the Alaska Constitution expressly subjects the governor’s 
clemency power to “procedure[s] prescribed by law,” the effectuating 
statute was notably silent on any process the governor was required to 
follow in exercising the power.163 The statute did charge the state Board 
of Parole with investigating any case the governor chose to refer to the 
board, and with providing the governor with a report of its investigation 
together with any other information the Board might have regarding the 
applicant.164 However, the governor had no affirmative obligation to 
seek information from the Board or any other entity. Both the process for 
evaluating petitions for clemency and the grants themselves were 
entirely within the governor’s discretion. 
The clemency legislation was codified at sections 33.20.070 through 
080 of the Alaska Statutes; it remained unchanged until 1989, when 
section 33.20.080 of the Alaska Statutes was amended as part of the 
Alaska Crime Victim’s Rights Act.165 The changes authorized victims of 
a crime against a person or arson in the first degree to request 
notification from the Board of Parole of any application for executive 
clemency submitted by a state prisoner convicted of the crime against 
the victim, and allowing the victim to comment in writing to the Board 
regarding the application.166 In 1996, increasing public awareness of the 
problem of domestic violence in Alaska led to a second amendment to 
the clemency statute. In the Domestic Violence Prevention and Victim 
Protection Act of 1996,167 domestic violence victims received the rights to 
request notice of clemency applications filed by their assailants, and to 
comment on those applications.168 
Although both amendments addressed how the Board should 
handle clemency requests referred to it by the governor, like the original 
statute, neither amendment actually required the governor to submit the 
applications to the Board, or to anyone else. In practice, therefore, while 
many administrations routinely submitted clemency applications to the 
Board for investigation, and many applicants petitioned the Board 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 2. 
 165. 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 59, 12. 
 166. Id. § 19. 
 167. Id. § 1. 
 168. Id. § 56. 
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directly pursuant to the Board’s own guidelines,169 some clemency 
applications were handled internally and exclusively by the governor’s 
office. In such cases, the Board of Parole might never learn of it,170 or 
learn of it only belatedly through media reports.171 This remained true 
for nearly half a century.172 Not until 2007, in the wake of public outcry 
over a controversial pardon and widespread calls for ethics reform in 
Juneau,173 did the Alaska legislature exercise its Constitutional authority 
to restrict the process by which the governor may grant clemency.174 
 
 169. See ALASKA BD. OF PAROLE, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN ALASKA: AN 
INFORMATIONAL BOOKLET FOR PROSPECTIVE APPLICANTS (2006), available at 
http://www.cjpf.org/clemency/AK_clemencyhandbook.pdf. 
 170. Because the statutes have never specified the form in which awards of 
clemency should be issued, the normal mechanisms for recording executive acts 
are not triggered when a governor exercises the clemency power. Alaska’s 
record of executive proclamations and orders do not include grants of clemency, 
nor are they recorded in the Alaska Administrative Journal. Alaska’s governors 
have used informal memoranda or letters issued from their office to grant 
clemency. Hence, although the prosecutions and convictions of the applicants 
are matters of public record (absent statutorily-mandated or court-ordered 
sealing of records to protect the privacy of certain victims), there is no public 
record of grants of executive clemency. 
 171. See Notify Crime Victim of Executive Clemency: Hearing on H.B. 69 Before the 
H. Judiciary Standing Comm., 25th Leg. (Alaska 2007) (hereinafter “Hearing on 
H.B. 69”) (testimony of Lawrence Jones, Exec. Dir., Alaska Board of Parole, on 
Jan. 22, 2007, at 1:15:43 p.m.). 
 172. For most of this period Alaska had no regulatory structure for tracking 
or maintaining a documentary record of applications for, and grants of, 
clemency. In 1997, however, the Department of Public Safety promulgated a new 
regulation requiring that within one month after an act of executive clemency, 
the Board of Parole’s executive director report to the state’s Central Repository 
of Criminal Justice Information a description of the grant of clemency, including 
the type of relief granted, the date of the grant, the charges for which clemency 
was granted, and various case tracking information. ALASKA ADMIN CODE tit. 13, 
§ 68.145 (2010). The flaw in this procedure was that nothing required the 
governor’s office to submit information on grants of clemency to the Board. 
 173. Juneau, Alaska’s capital and a city inaccessible except by air or sea, was 
viewed by many as a seat of cronyism and insider corruption practiced by an 
insular group of politicians serving an oil company and other corporate 
interests. In recent years the name “Corrupt Bastards Club” has been widely 
used to designate Alaska legislators implicated in a massive ongoing federal 
corruption investigation. This group included legislators linked to taking 
substantial campaign contributions from the oil field services company VECO 
Corp. Several legislators associated with the Club were eventually convicted on 
various corruption charges and sentenced to prison. See generally Matt Volz, 
From Barroom Joke to Federal Warrants, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2008, 
http://www.adn.com/2006/09/05/479599/from-barroom-joke-to-federal-
warrants.html; Alaska’s Corrupt Bastards Club, ALASKA REPORT, http:// 
www.alaskareport.com/news/z49999_corrupt_bastards.htm (last visited Jan. 
27, 2011). 
 174. See infra Part II.C.1. 
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Over the nearly 50 years spanning the beginning of the Egan 
Administration in January 1959 and the end of the Murkowski 
Administration in December 2006, Alaska’s governors granted 
approximately 188 awards of clemency. The accompanying table sets 
out a summary of clemency applications and grants by administration, 
along with the political affiliation of each governor.175 
 
 
Table 1. Applications for Clemency Granted by Alaska Governors, 1959–Present 







Egan (D) Jan 1959 Dec 1966 472 96 20.33 
Hickel (R) Dec 1966 Jan 1969 93 22 23.65 
Miller (R) Jan 1969 Dec 1970 46 4 8.70 
Egan (D) Dec 1970 Dec 1974 142 13 9.15 
Hammond (R) Dec 1974 Dec 1982 101 13 12.87 
Sheffield (D) Dec 1982 Dec 1986 127 13 10.23 
Cowper (D) Dec 1986 Dec 1990 161 13 8.07 
Hickel (R) Dec 1990 Dec 1994 88 5 5.68 
Knowles (D) Dec 1994 Dec 2002 102 2 1.96 
Murkowski (R) Dec 2002 Dec 2006 Unknown 7 0 
Palin (R)  Dec 2006 July 2009 Unknown 0 0 
Parnell (R) July 2009 Present Unknown 0 0 
 
 
In accord with national trends,176 Alaska’s early governors were 
generally freer in their exercise of the clemency power than were later 
governors.177 This trend is most notable in the first years of statehood. 
 
 175. These numbers reflect records maintained by the Alaska Board of Parole. 
It is an approximation only, in that the state has not maintained a 
comprehensive record of clemency applications and grants since statehood; 
clemency awards handled entirely within the governor’s office may not have 
been reported to the Board of Parole. See supra note 170.  Board of Parole records aggregating clemency applications and grants do not 
include application numbers for the Murkowski, Palin, and Parnell 
administrations. 
 176. See discussion supra Parts I.B.4, I.B.5. 
 177. Alaska’s third governor, Keith Miller, granted just four requests for 
clemency, nine fewer than the four governors who followed him. What appears 
to be an exception to the generally liberal approach to clemency in the early 
years of statehood, however, is more likely a product of the length of the Miller 
administration than of a more conservative attitude toward clemency on the part 
of Governor Miller. Miller took office when Governor Walter Hickel resigned the 
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Over the course of his first two terms in office,178 from 1959 to 1966, 
Governor Egan issued ninety-six awards of clemency. Sixty-six of these 
were total pardons; the remainder, according to Board of Parole 
statistics, were commutations of sentence. Governor Egan’s record 
stands in marked contrast to that of Governor Knowles, who held office 
from 1994 to 2002. Governor Knowles issued just two awards of 
clemency, both of them pardons.179 
Although Alaska’s governors during this period were statutorily 
authorized to exercise sole discretion in awarding clemency, as a matter 
of institutional practice that began with the territorial governors, every 
administration appointed or continued from a prior administration 
some type of advisory panel to assist the governor in evaluating 
clemency requests. Typically called Executive Clemency Commissions 
or Clemency Advisory Committees, these panels have comprised 
varying numbers of members over the years. Recent administrations 
have used three-person panels, the members of which have been 
appointed by the governor. Members of these panels served entirely at 
the governor’s pleasure; the extent to which individual governors made 
use of the panels was similarly discretionary.180 The panels have never 
been constitutionally or statutorily mandated.181 
Board of Parole records reveal substantial variation from 
administration to administration in the number of times these panels 
met.182 Not surprisingly in light of the historical record of petitions 
 
governorship to become Secretary of the Interior. Thus, his term lasted slightly 
less than two years. 
 178. Governor Egan was elected to a third term, which he served from 1970 to 
1974. During this term he issued thirteen awards of clemency, substantially 
fewer than he awarded during his previous terms. Interestingly, as best the 
Board of Parole can determine from the records available to it, the three 
governors immediately following Egan’s third term, Hammond, Sheffield, and 
Cowper, respectively, also issued thirteen awards of clemency each. Hammond, 
however, did so over two terms; Sheffield and Cowper held single terms. 
 179. See supra Table 1. 
 180. See Boards & Commissions Factsheets: Clemency Advisory Committee, OFFICE 
OF GOVERNOR SEAN PARNELL, http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell/services/boards-
commissions/boardfactsheets.html?i=017 (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) [hereinafter 
Factsheets]. 
 181. See e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 21; ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.20.070–80 (2010). 
See also Alaska Attorney General Op. 663-87-0436 (April 20, 1987) (“The 
governor’s executive clemency advisory committee is one of long standing in 
Alaska, although it is not a body created by statute.”); cf. Factsheets, supra note 
180. 
 182. The following figures are taken from records maintained internally by 
the Board of Parole. Their accuracy depends on the extent to which each 
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granted,183 the panel serving Governor Egan met most frequently, 
holding its first meeting in December of 1959, and meeting a total of 
thirty-two times before Egan left office in 1966.184 In contrast, Walter 
Hickel, whose first administration followed Egan’s and lasted for just 
over two years, convened meetings of his clemency advisory panel just 
seven times. The first meeting, on December 22, 1966, demonstrates one 
of the most pervasive and well-known types of clemency—the 
Christmas pardon. The Hickel Administration reported this as a meeting 
to consider “Special Christmas Clemency Actions.”185 
Governor Knowles, with the lowest number of pardons (two) of 
any governor prior to the 2007 statutory changes,186 convened his 
clemency advisory panel six times. A press release issued by Knowles’s 
 
administration accurately recorded and reported to the Board all advisory panel 
meetings. 
 183. As noted, Egan granted ninety-six petitions for clemency during his first 
two terms in office. See supra text accompanying notes 175–79. 
 184. During his third term as governor from 1970 to 1974, Egan convened 
sixteen meetings of his clemency advisory commission. 
 185. The Christmas, or holiday pardon, has become a political tradition in 
most states and at the federal level. Many administrations over the years have 
used the Christmas pardon to make a public expression of thanks to those who 
have served in the military. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, for 
example, President Truman announced a full presidential pardon was “the 
Christmas present” to several thousand former federal convicts who served with 
merit in the armed forces during the war. Truman Pardons Ex-Convicts Who 
Served with Merit in War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1945, at 1. The New York Times 
reported that those pardoned included more than 2,000 who were paroled 
directly from federal prisons for induction into the Army. Id.; see also supra note 5 
(discussing Lincoln’s Christmas pardon). 
A number of Alaskans over the years have benefitted from presidential 
Christmas pardons. On Christmas Eve, 1923, President Coolidge excused the 
unpaid part of a fine owed by Louis Grimstad, convicted at Unga, Alaska of 
assault and battery. Grimstad was sentenced to six months imprisonment and 
fined $500. At the time of his pardon, he had served out his sentence but was 
still incarcerated for nonpayment of the fine. Coolidge Frees Eleven Prisoners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1923, at 1. Generations later, President Clinton granted Christmas 
Eve clemency to thirty-three individuals. Among them was a forty-two-year-old 
state worker, Michael Krukar, from Anchorage, who was convicted of a single 
felony count of distributing marijuana. Krukar had paid his fine and completed 
his community service, but like many, wanted a pardon to reduce the stigma of 
his conviction. See Anchorage Man Receives Pardon from President Clinton, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Dec. 26, 1998. The tradition of the 
Christmas pardon continues—New York Governor David Paterson announced 
twenty-four pardons on Christmas Eve 2010. Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s 
Office, Governor Paterson Announces Pardons (Dec. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/press/122410-
GovPatersonAnnouncesPardons.html. 
 186. See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
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press secretary provides a clear example of the advisory panel’s role in 
this administration. The release notified the media of a pardon granted 
to a seventy-two-year-old retired bank clerk convicted of manslaughter 
in 1946.187 James Willis, an African-American, claimed he acted in self-
defense when he stabbed a shipmate during the course of a melee that 
broke out among the crew of a Coast Guard vessel docked in 
Wrangell.188 Willis and his shipmates were on shore leave to celebrate 
the end of World War II.189 Trial records and the ship’s log suggest that 
Willis was the victim of a racially motivated attack and racially charged 
trial—witnesses reported that several southern soldiers took offense 
when Willis danced with a white or Native American woman in a 
Wrangell nightclub.190 The case was reopened in the mid-1990s when 
evidence supporting Willis’s innocence was reported to the Juneau 
Public Defender’s office.191 
Knowles’ press release specifically states that the governor decided 
to pardon Willis on the recommendation of the state Executive 
Clemency Advisory Board: 
The Clemency Board made its recommendation based on the 
fact that Willis has lived an exemplary life since his release and 
that he is in poor health, partially as a result of injuries suffered 
aboard the Sellstrom [the vessel on which he served]. In her 
report to the governor, Lt. Gov. Fran Ulmer, a Clemency Board 
member, wrote, “some sentiment was also expressed regarding 
the racial prejudice of the times and circumstances surrounding 
the incident and the trial, which may very well have influenced 
the outcome.”192 
The Clemency Advisory Committee under current governor Sean 
Parnell comprises the Lieutenant Governor, one public member, and one 
Department of Law (state attorney general’s office) representative. The 
Committee Factsheet posted on the Administration’s web site notes that 
this typically has been the composition of the committee. The 
 
 187. E-News Release, Office of the Governor, Press Office, Knowles Pardons 
Man Convicted of Manslaughter in 1946 (Nov. 26, 1997), at 1. 
 188. Id at 2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 3. 
 191. Id. Hofstra University law students located old Navy and FBI records 
related to the case and interviewed shipmates. Id. One eyewitness affidavit 
reported: “My feeling in this matter . . . was that Mr. Willis was not the instigator 
and was merely defending himself.”  Id. 
 192. Id.; see also After 50 Years, a Pardon, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Nov. 26, 1997, available 
at http:// www.juneauempire.com/stories/112697/pardon.html. 
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Committee’s stated function reflects the practice described in the Willis 
pardon, a practice not required by law but formalized over the years—to 
review clemency applications “and make recommendations to the 
Governor.”193 
Governor Parnell’s Clemency Committee Factsheet also notes that 
rather than appoint or continue the committee, the Governor may grant 
advisory authority to the Board of Parole.194 Interestingly, the Board of 
Parole’s only statutory role in the clemency process during this period 
was to investigate cases referred to it by the governor, and in such cases 
to provide notice to certain victims, maintain victim contact information, 
and convey comments and investigative results to the governor.195 
Nevertheless, over time the Board has become the most visible point of 
public access to the clemency process. At least one governor directed his 
staff that all clemency petitions should be forwarded to the Board of 
Parole.196 As the Board’s role in the clemency process became 
institutionalized, it developed formal procedures for handling requests 
coming directly from offenders; the only formal (though not statutorily 
mandated) process for applying for executive clemency in Alaska 
requires application to the Board of Parole, rather than to the governor’s 
office.197 
There has been relatively little judicial development of clemency 
law in Alaska in the years since statehood, and none of the cases that do 
address clemency issues have directly addressed the scope of the 
legislative power to establish clemency procedures.198 The Alaska 
Supreme Court, however, has addressed the due process rights of 
applicants, adopting essentially the same standard as that used by the 
 
 193. Factsheets, supra note 180. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.080 (2010). As noted in note 172, supra, 
from 1997 on, the Board was also responsible for referring certain information 
related to clemency awards to the Central Repository of Criminal Justice 
Information. 
 196. See Lewis v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 139 P.3d 1266, 1272 (Alaska 2006). 
 197. See ALASKA BD. OF PAROLE, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN ALASKA, supra note 
169; ALASKA BD. OF PAROLE, EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION 
FORM (2006), available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/ 
Parole/documents/Clemency%20Eligibility%20Determination%20Form.doc 
(“This is the initial form that must be read, completed, and provided to the Alaska 
Board of Parole to Determine Your Eligibility for Executive Clemency 
Consideration.”). 
 198. Cf. Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174, 1182–83 (Alaska 1986) (defining the 
phrase “[s]ubject to the procedure prescribed by law” as meaning that the 
governor’s power to grant pardons, commutations and reprieves is solely the 
province of the executive, “subject to procedures established by the legislature”). 
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federal courts.199 Thus in Alaska, as elsewhere, due process protections 
apply to the clemency process, but the level of protection afforded is 
minimal. Where the state authorizes clemency upon the showing of 
certain circumstances, applicants must have “a fair opportunity to make 
a factual showing” that the circumstances exist.200 To measure whether 
this standard has been met, the Alaska Supreme Court has applied the 
test outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.201 The 
Eldridge test takes the following factors into account: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.202 
Finally, before shifting attention from the prior clemency process to 
the new one, a last point should be considered—it is the critical 
importance of clemency to the individuals involved. James Willis, the 
African-American sailor who received a pardon from Governor 
Knowles for a conviction occurring more than half a century before, 
spoke movingly in an affidavit for the court about his experience. Willis 
said: 
I have suffered for over fifty years. To this day I cannot 
understand how all of these terrible things have happened to 
me because I danced with a woman whose skin was a different 
color than mine. I would like to live my last days with dignity, 
my good name and die as a soldier that served his country 
proudly.203 
 
 199. Lewis, 139 P.3d at 1269–70. 
 200. Lewis, 139 P.3d at 1270. 
 201. Id.; see 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 202. Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 203. Svend Holst, After 50 Years a Pardon, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Nov. 26, 1997, 
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/112697/pardon.html. 
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C. Making Clemency Visible—Alaska’s New Clemency Process 
1. The Impetus for Change: Governor Murkowski and Alaska’s 
Whitewater Case 
In the spring of 1999, Gary Stone, a 46 year-old heavy equipment 
operator and father of five was killed in an avalanche while working on 
construction of a hydroelectric project in Cordova, Alaska.204 His 
employer, Whitewater Engineering Corporation, was subsequently 
convicted of criminally negligent homicide amid allegations the 
company’s principals were aware of the extreme avalanche danger but 
took insufficient precautions to protect employees.205 The conviction 
followed a plea agreement pursuant to which the state agreed to drop its 
criminal charges against the company’s president and sole owner,206 and 
the company agreed to pay restitution to Mr. Stone’s family.207 
Whitewater was sentenced to a fine of $275,000, with $125,000 
suspended, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $17,431.60.208 
In 2005, Alaska Governor Frank Murkowski pardoned Whitewater. 
The pardon process was entirely internal to the Governor’s office with 
no input from the Board of Parole209 and no notice to the family of the 
deceased employee.210 The pardon, and the concomitant distress 
experienced by Mr. Stone’s family, were widely reported by the Alaska 
media.211 Upon hearing of the pardon from a newspaper reporter, a 
daughter was quoted to have said, “I was in shock and totally in the 
 
 204. Governor Signs Bill Restricting Pardon Power, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Feb. 21, 2007,  
available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/022107/loc_ 
20070221002.shtml; see also Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum (Cole brief) at 
1, Alaska v. Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235 CR (Alaska Super. Ct. 
Oct. 29, 2001). 
 205. State’s Sentencing Memorandum at 10, Alaska v. Whitewater Eng’g 
Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235 CR (Nov. 2, 2001). 
 206. See Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum (Orlansky brief) at 14, Alaska 
v. Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235 CR (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 
2001) (setting out corporate ownership and control). 
 207. State’s Sentencing Memorandum at 9, supra note 205. 
 208. Judgment and Order of Commitment/Probation at 1, Alaska v. 
Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235 CR (Nov. 14, 2001). 
 209. See Hearing on H.B. 69, supra note 171. 
 210. Pat Forgey, Legislators Rush to Rein in Pardons, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Jan. 31, 
2007,  available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/013107/ 
sta_20070131017.shtml. 
 211. See id.; Ashby Jones, Pardons Received in Whitewater (No, Not That 
Whitewater), WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/26/ 
pardons-received-in-whitewater-no-not-that-whitewater/; Steve Quinn, Bills 
Would Alter the Pardon Process, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Jan. 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/012507/sta_20070125010.shtml. 
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dark”; “to not be blindsided would have been really nice . . . . If we 
would have been told this is something being considered and this might 
happen, then at least we would have had a chance to digest what might 
happen.”212 
According to the Juneau Empire, at the time of the pardon 
Whitewater continued to owe the state $150,000 in unpaid fines; with 
approximately six years of accrued interest the total debt was estimated 
at $250,000.213 A former state legislator who urged Murkowski to grant 
the pardon was reported to have warned the governor “that allowing 
the conviction to stand would ‘send a chilling message’ to construction 
companies and other companies in the state.”214 As a result of the 
pardon, the media reported, the state was barred from collecting the 
unpaid fine and accrued interest.215 
The Whitewater pardon was issued just days before Murkowski, 
who lost his bid for reelection in the Republican primary to Sarah Palin, 
left office.216 At the time, pollsters reported him to be the most 
unpopular governor in the nation, save one.217 
The confluence of public outrage over the circumstances and effect 
of the Whitewater pardon, Governor Murkowski’s notable 
unpopularity, and the call for ethics reform that swept Sarah Palin into 
office established a political climate ripe for legislation amending 
Alaska’s clemency process. And thus it was, that the first bill Governor 
Palin signed into law from the legislative session immediately following 
the Murkowski administration218 was a bill written to limit 
gubernatorial discretion in the process by which clemency is granted.219 
 
 212. Quinn, supra note 211. 
 213. Pat Forgey, How Controversial Pardon Made it Through, JUNEAU EMPIRE, 
Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/022107/ 
loc_20070221003.shtml. Whitewater paid the required restitution to the 
deceased’s family, and a federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
fine. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Pat Forgey, Governor Signs Bill Restricting Pardon Power, JUNEAU 
EMPIRE, Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/ 
022107/loc_20070221002.shtml. 
 217. Andrew Petty, Murkowski’s Approval Rating Sinks to 20 Percent, JUNEAU 
EMPIRE, June 20, 2006, available at http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/ 
062006/sta_20060620001.shtml. The only governor reported to be less popular—
and by just one percentage point—was Ohio’s governor Bob Taft, said to have 
been the only Ohio governor ever charged with a crime while in office. Id. 
 218. ARCHIVES ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, 25th Legislative Session, Session 
Laws 2007, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ passed_leg.asp?session= 
25&sel=13 (last visited Jan. 30, 2011); Forgey, supra note 216. 
 219. Hearing on H.B. 69, supra note 171. 
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In essence, the sponsors of House Bill 69 sought to prohibit governors 
from granting clemency without first referring the clemency application 
to the Board of Parole for investigation, and providing notice to victims 
of the offender.220 Representative Ralph Samuels wrote in his Sponsor 
Statement: 
This amendment will not only ensure that victims of crimes are 
notified of the governor’s intent to grant clemency but also 
allow them to become part of the process. By notifying the 
victims in advance, all parties involved can provide 
information that may or may not impact the final decision to 
grant clemency.221 
On February 20, 2007, fewer than ninety days after Governor 
Murkowski pardoned Whitewater Engineering, Governor Palin signed 
into law Chapter 1 of the Session Laws of Alaska 2007, an Act Relating 
to Executive Clemency.222 
2. The New Clemency Law: Mandated Procedures and Effect 
The revisions to Alaska’s clemency law took effect on May 21, 
2007.223 The new session law amended section 33.20.080 of the Alaska 
Statutes. It now specifies that the governor may not grant clemency 
without first providing 120 days notice of the proposed action to the 
state Board of Parole.224 During this 120 day waiting period, the board is 
required to investigate the case and submit a report of the investigation 
to the governor.225 The board must also send notice of the proposed act 
of clemency to the Department of Law, the Office of Victims’ Rights, and 
any victims in the case who suffered domestic violence, a crime against 
the person, or arson in the first degree.226 These victims may comment 
on the proposed clemency, and the victims’ comments must be 
forwarded to the governor.227 However, the governor is under no 
 
 220. See id. 
 221. Sponsor Statement: House Bill 69, THE HOUSE MAJORITY (Jan. 22, 2007), 
http://housemajority.org/spon.php?id=25hb69-12. 
 222. See H. Journal, 25th Leg., at 0320 (Alaska 2007), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_jrn_page.asp?session=25&bill=HB69&jr
n=0320&hse=H. 
 223. Id. at 0321. 
 224. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.080(a) (2010). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. § 33.20.080(b). 
 227. Id. 
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statutory obligation to consider the comments or to follow any 
recommendations made by the board.228 
The investigatory and notice requirements imposed on the 
governor’s office are consistent with national trends. The movement 
toward fairness, predictability, transparency, and accountability that 
have guided changes in sentencing over the past thirty years have also 
led to changes in clemency legislation. As one commentator noted, “A 
pardon is an act of executive grace, but to be seen as legitimate it needs 
to be handled openly and fairly.”229 
The 2007 legislation necessitated a restructuring of the way in 
which the Office of the Governor and the Board of Parole managed 
clemency applications. Thus, as of this writing, the Board of Parole is 
working to formalize a new regulatory process that will ensure 
compliance with the revised statute. During this interim period 
(formally, since the passage of the new statute, but in practice since the 
end of the Murkowski administration), all clemency petitions have been 
held in abeyance. 
A draft procedure is currently under review by the Office of the 
Governor. It has four distinct phases (and ten different steps) before 
clemency may be granted. The four phases include: (1) the application; 
(2) investigation by the Board of Parole staff, which includes notice to 
victim(s) or other entities specified by statute and collection and 
transmittal of victim comments; (3) review and recommendation by the 
Executive Clemency Advisory Committee and the Board of Parole; and 
(4) the executive clemency decision by the governor and notification to 
applicant and to victims/other entities specified by statute.230 
The proposed system makes several minor changes to the prior 
process, and more clearly specifies each step in the investigation and 
review procedures. The traditional composition of the Executive 
Clemency Advisory Committee (a three-member panel comprising the 
Lieutenant Governor, a designee from the Attorney General’s Office, 
and a representative of the general public appointed by the governor) is 
retained. The Committee will continue to operate as a non-regulated 
body. 
 
 228. See id. § 33.20.080. 
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The most significant alteration in the overall process, apart from the 
mandatory notice to victims, is the elimination of the direct request to 
the governor that completely bypassed investigation by the parole board 
and review by the Executive Clemency Advisory Board. In other words, 
it is no longer possible for a clemency application to be handled solely 
within the governor’s office. 
 
III. AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE 
Blackstone wrote that the effect of the King’s pardon “is to make 
the offender a new man; to acquit him of all corporeal penalties and 
forfeitures . . . and not so much to restore his former, as to give him a 
new, credit and capacity.”231 However, as to the former credit, he 
continued, “nothing can restore or purify the blood when once 
corrupted.”232 The problem noted by Blackstone, that offenders retain 
the stigma of conviction even once pardoned, is a critical problem not 
addressed under Alaska’s clemency system. Even a full pardon will not 
restore an offender’s clean record.233 
The stigma of a criminal conviction can pose a nearly 
insurmountable barrier to former offenders seeking to reintegrate into 
the community and find employment. While testifying before the Alaska 
legislature in 2007, Lawrence Jones, then executive director of the Board 
of Parole, noted that “the vast majority” of individuals contacting the 
Board regarding clemency had already served their sentences and were 
simply seeking to clear their name for employment purposes.234 
Although the Whitewater pardon discussed above is the most 
notorious of the Murkowski administration pardons, another pardon 
issued that same day—the pardon of Ryan Angelo Sargento—provoked 
a second, much later, wave of criticism. Sargento’s mother was a state 
employee appointed by Governor Murkowski.235 She was the one who 
requested the pardon on her son’s behalf, first in a letter to the governor, 
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and then in a note to the governor’s wife.236 In June 2010, three and a 
half years after receiving Murkowski’s pardon, Sargento was charged 
with first-degree murder in the shooting death of an acquaintance.237 
As one would predict, the murder charges prompted renewed 
discussion and criticism of the Murkowski pardons. From a policy 
perspective, however, it is not the murder charge that makes the 
Sargento pardon interesting. What should make the Sargento pardon 
interesting for policymakers is the narrative in his mother’s application 
to Murkowski. She wrote: “Every time he seeks for employment he’s 
denied because of this conviction on his record. Please Governor, help 
my son better his life and grant him absolute pardon.”238 Thus, 
Sargento’s pardon was one of hundreds, perhaps thousands, filed in 
Alaska over the years by those who have fully served their sentence, as 
had Sargento,239 but who are unable to find work as a result of the 
continuing stigma of a criminal conviction. 
The difficulties experienced by Alaskans convicted of criminal 
offenses as they transition back into the community is emblematic of a 
national crisis. In the early twenty-first century, approximately one in 
every 143 Americans is behind bars. In comparison, the rate in many 
Western European countries is approximately one in 1,000 persons.240 
More troubling than the sheer numbers of imprisoned is the 
disproportionate impact U.S. sentencing policies have had on minority 
communities. In 2003, Justice Anthony Kennedy addressed the 
American Bar Association regarding the justice system’s failure to 
concern itself with the post-incarceration fate of offenders. He noted that 
nationwide, “more than forty percent of the prison population 
consist[ed] of African-American inmates. About ten percent of African-
American men in their mid-to-late 20s [were] behind bars. In some cities 
more than fifty percent of young African-American men [were] under 
the supervision of the criminal justice system.”241 In Alaska, it is the 
state’s indigenous populations that are disproportionately suffering the 
collateral consequences of criminal convictions. At the end of 2009, 
about thirty percent of Alaska’s offender population were Alaska Native 
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and just over ten percent were Black, percentages notably 
disproportionate to their percentages in the general population—sixteen 
percent and four percent, respectively.242 
Justice Kennedy called upon the Bar to “start a new public 
discussion” about America’s prison system and rehabilitation of the 
incarcerated.243 He noted that “[t]he pardon process, of late, seems to 
have been drained of its moral force. Pardons have become 
infrequent.”244  He encouraged the Bar to “consider a recommendation 
to reinvigorate the pardon process at the state and federal levels.”245 
Justice Kennedy also highlighted the critical importance of 
employment for former offenders: 
The most important predictive factor as to whether an offender 
will become a recidivist appears to be employment. Those who 
find work are less likely to re-offend. Those who cannot find 
legitimate work are more likely to engage in criminal acts. To 
the extent that legal and attitudinal barriers to employing 
people with convictions can be removed, the chances of work 
increase and the likelihood of recidivism decreases.246 
Alaska Supreme Court Justice Walter Carpeneti has spoken of the 
magnitude of the problem in Alaska’s criminal justice system: 
Probably no problem is of greater concern to us at this time 
than the alarmingly high rates of recidivism in our state. Fully 
sixty-six percent of offenders — two-thirds of those 
incarcerated — will reoffend and return to jail at some point in 
their lives. This is an astounding number, and one that must 
motivate all of us to examine what causes so many Alaskans to 
spend their lives cycling in and out of the criminal justice 
system.247 
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Access to the pardon process is an important first step in promoting 
the reentry and rehabilitation of offenders who have completed their 
sentences. A pardon, however, will not erase the fact of the conviction or 
eradicate the bias those who have been incarcerated face as they attempt 
to reenter society and the workforce. In recognition of this simple truth, 
a number of jurisdictions have enacted laws providing a mechanism 
through which former offenders may have their records expunged.248 
Alaska is not one of those states.249 
 
CONCLUSION 
“A people confident in its laws and institutions should not be 
ashamed of mercy.”250 As Alaska moves into a new era of clemency 
under the 2007 statutory changes, both the legislative and executive 
branches should consider extending the principles of mercy and 
forgiveness embodied in the state’s vibrant history of pardons and 
commutations, and should explore developing a means by which 
deserving offenders may expunge their conviction and reenter society 
and the workforce with a clean record. 
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